3 citations · 7 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
Showing cs.GTShow all
3 papers · 1 filter
cs.GT2021★ 3 cited
Fairness Maximization among Offline Agents in Online-Matching Markets
Will Ma, Pan Xu, Yifan Xu
Matching markets involve heterogeneous agents (typically from two parties) who are paired for mutual benefit. During the last decade, matching markets have emerged and grown rapidl…
cs.GT2019
Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Auctions for Multiple Buyers with Ordinal Preferences over Fixed-price Items
Will Ma
In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian revenue-maximizing mechanism design model where the items have fixed, exogenously-given prices. Buyers are unit-demand and have an ordinal ra…
cs.GT2019★ 1 cited
Separation between Second Price Auctions with Personalized Reserves and the Revenue Optimal Auction
Will Ma, Balasubramanian Sivan
What fraction of the single item buyers setting's expected optimal revenue MyeRev can the second price auction with reserves achieve? In the special case where the buyers' valu…