2 citations · 9 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
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A Map of Diverse Synthetic Stable Roommates Instances
Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger, Stanisław Szufa
Focusing on Stable Roommates (SR) instances, we contribute to the toolbox for conducting experiments for stable matching problems. We introduce a polynomial-time computable pseudom…
Deepening the (Parameterized) Complexity Analysis of Incremental Stable Matching Problems
Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger, Rolf Niedermeier
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change…
Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences
Matthias Bentert, Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger +1
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al.…
Adapting Stable Matchings to Forced and Forbidden Pairs
Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching , a set of forced pairs, and a set of forbi…
Multivariate Algorithmics for Eliminating Envy by Donating Goods
Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger +2
Fairly dividing a set of indivisible resources to a set of agents is of utmost importance in some applications. However, after an allocation has been implemented the preferences of…
Theory of and Experiments on Minimally Invasive Stability Preservation in Changing Two-Sided Matching Markets
Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger, Rolf Niedermeier
Following up on purely theoretical work of Bredereck et al. [AAAI 2020], we contribute further theoretical insights into adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we…
A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas
Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger
In the Hospital Residents problem with lower and upper quotas (), the goal is to find a stable matching of residents to hospitals where the number of residents matched to…
Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage
Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger +1
We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to m…