9 citations · 16 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs
Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille
We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the…
Undiscounted Equilibrium in Positive Recursive Absorbing Games with Non-Rectangular Absorption Structure
Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille
An absorbing game is a stochastic game with a single nonabsorbing state. Such a game is called recursive if all players receive a payoff of 0 in the nonabsorbing state, and positiv…
Stationary social learning in a changing environment
Raphaël Lévy, Marcin Pęski, Nicolas Vieille
We consider social learning in a changing world. Society can remain responsive to state changes only if agents regularly act upon fresh information, which limits the value of socia…
Optimal Dynamic Information Provision
Jerome Renault, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille
We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An informed advisor decides how much information to provide to an uninform…
Markov games with frequent actions and incomplete information
Pierre Cardaliaguet, Catherine Rainer, Dinah Rosenberg +1
We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player obse…
Random Stopping Times in Stopping Problems and Stopping Games
Eilon Solan, Boris Tsirelson, Nicolas Vieille
Three notions of random stopping times exist in the literature. We introduce two concepts of equivalence of random stopping times, motivated by optimal stopping problems and stoppi…