activity
19982003
most citedComplexity Results about Nash Equilibria

218 citations · 244 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2003Show all

5 papers · 1 filter

cs.AI200322 cited

Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

In most real-world settings, due to limited time or other resources, an agent cannot perform all potentially useful deliberation and information gathering actions. This leads to th…

cs.GT2003

Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things…

cs.GT2003

BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

We present BL-WoLF, a framework for learnability in repeated zero-sum games where the cost of learning is measured by the losses the learning agent accrues (rather than the number…

cs.GT2003

How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?

Vincent Conitzer, Jerome Lang, Tuomas Sandholm

In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal re…

cs.GT2003

AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

A satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm should, {\em at a minimum}, learn to play optimally against stationary opponents and converge to a Nash equilibrium in self-play. The a…