218 citations · 244 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things…
BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
We present BL-WoLF, a framework for learnability in repeated zero-sum games where the cost of learning is measured by the losses the learning agent accrues (rather than the number…
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
Vincent Conitzer, Jerome Lang, Tuomas Sandholm
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal re…
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
A satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm should, {\em at a minimum}, learn to play optimally against stationary opponents and converge to a Nash equilibrium in self-play. The a…
Complexity of Mechanism Design
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism des…
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be…