13 papers
When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations
Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki
One of the central questions in discrete fair division is whether fairness and efficiency can be achieved simultaneously. For indivisible goods, a canonical relaxation of envy-free…
Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness for Mixed Goods and Chores
Haris Aziz, Xiaolin Bu, Xinhang Lu +4
We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing indivisible items among agents with additive utilities. In our model, an item can be a good yielding non-negative utilities to s…
Optimal Subsidy Bounds for Goods and Chores: One Dollar Each Suffices
Xinhang Lu, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items to agents with additive utilities. In our setting, each indivisible item may be a good, yielding non-negative utility to s…
Counterexamples to EFX for Submodular and Subadditive Valuations
Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki
The existence of EFX allocations is a fundamental question in fair division. In this paper, we construct a three-agent, eight-good instance with monotone subadditive valuations suc…
Maximum Welfare Allocations under Quantile Valuations
Haris Aziz, Shivika Narang, Mashbat Suzuki
We propose a new model for aggregating preferences over a set of indivisible items based on a quantile value. In this model, each agent is endowed with a specific quantile, and the…
Social Welfare Maximization in Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty
Haris Aziz, Yuhang Guo, Venkateswara Rao Kagita +2
Approval voting is widely used for making multi-winner voting decisions. The canonical rule (also called Approval Voting) used in the setting aims to maximize social welfare by sel…