2 citations · 3 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Online Bayesian Persuasion Without a Clue
Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Bollini, Matteo Castiglioni +2
We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-rel…
Regret-Minimizing Contracts: Agency Under Uncertainty
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi
We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncert…
Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +3
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the on…
Selling Information while Being an Interested Party
Matteo Castiglioni, Francesco Bacchiocchi, Alberto Marchesi +2
We study the algorithmic problem faced by an information holder (seller) who wants to optimally sell such information to a budged-constrained decision maker (buyer) that has to und…
Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcome
Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme in order to incentivize…
Last-iterate Convergence to Trembling-hand Perfect Equilibria
Martino Bernasconi, Alberto Marchesi, Francesco Trovò
Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has severa…