4 papers
Equilibrium Play Without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
Equilibrium play in two-player zero-sum games is usually justified via epistemic assumptions, such as mutual knowledge of rationality and beliefs, that go far beyond the rationalit…
Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations
Florian Brandl, Warut Suksompong, Nicholas Teh
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible goods with binary valuations. In this setting, the maximum Nash welfare rule, the leximin rule, and all additive welfarist rules with…
Axioms for Correlated Equilibrium
Florian Brandl
We characterize correlated equilibrium in finite normal-form games. Interpreting correlated strategies as action recommendations, we show that correlated equilibrium is the unique…
Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice Revisited
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
Brandt et al. (2016) characterized a probabilistic social choice function known as maximal lotteries within a framework based on fractional preference profiles, which abstracts awa…