29 citations · 60 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Approximation and Convergence of Large Atomic Congestion Games
Roberto Cominetti, Marco Scarsini, Marc Schröder +1
We consider the question of whether, and in what sense, Wardrop equilibria provide a good approximation for Nash equilibria in atomic unsplittable congestion games with a large num…
Ordinary and Prophet Planning under Uncertainty in Bernoulli Congestion Games
Roberto Cominetti, Marco Scarsini, Marc Schröder +1
We consider an atomic congestion game in which each player participates in the game with an exogenous and known probability , independently of everybody else, or…
Computing large market equilibria using abstractions
Christian Kroer, Alexander Peysakhovich, Eric Sodomka +1
Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design, for example in fair division of items. However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of info…
Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets
Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi +4
Mature internet advertising platforms offer high-level campaign management tools to help advertisers run their campaigns, often abstracting away the intricacies of how each ad is p…
Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets
Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Eric Sodomka +1
Budgets play a significant role in real-world sequential auction markets such as those implemented by internet companies. To maximize the value provided to auction participants, sp…
Asymptotically tight bounds for inefficiency in risk-averse selfish routing
Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova, Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
We consider a nonatomic selfish routing model with independent stochastic travel times, represented by mean and variance latency functions for each edge that depend on their flows.…
The Burden of Risk Aversion in Mean-Risk Selfish Routing
E. Nikolova, N. Stier-Moses
Considering congestion games with uncertain delays, we compute the inefficiency introduced in network routing by risk-averse agents. At equilibrium, agents may select paths that do…