50 citations · 83 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
On Imperfect Recall in Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams
James Fox, Matt MacDermott, Lewis Hammond +3
Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are a popular game-theoretic model based on Bayesian networks. In some settings, MAIDs offer significant advantages over extensive-form game…
k-Prize Weighted Voting Games
Wei-Chen Lee, David Hyland, Alessandro Abate +5
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly…
A Mathematical Analysis of an Election System Proposed by Gottlob Frege
Paul Harrenstein, Marie-Louise Lackner, Martin Lackner
In 1998 a long-lost proposal for an election law by Gottlob Frege (1848--1925) was rediscovered in the Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek in Jena, Germany. The method tha…
Nash Equilibrium and Bisimulation Invariance
Julian Gutierrez, Paul Harrenstein, Giuseppe Perelli +1
Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as…
Fractional Hedonic Games
Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt +3
The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribe…
k-Majority Digraphs and the Hardness of Voting with a Constant Number of Voters
Georg Bachmeier, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist +4
Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph may be induced as the pairwise majority relation of some preference profile. How…
Boolean Hedonic Games
Haris Aziz, Paul Harrenstein, Jérôme Lang +1
We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care about the makeup of the coalition…
Testing Substitutability of Weak Preferences
Haris Aziz, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the re…
Individual-based stability in hedonic games depending on the best or worst players
Haris Aziz, Paul Harrenstein, Evangelia Pyrga
We consider coalition formation games in which each player has preferences over the other players and his preferences over coalitions are based on the best player (-/B…
Set-Rationalizable Choice and Self-Stability
Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein
A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which \citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to tw…
Recognizing Members of the Tournament Equilibrium Set is NP-hard
Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein
A recurring theme in the mathematical social sciences is how to select the "most desirable" elements given a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Schwartz's tourname…