34 citations · 103 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers
Extending Layered Attestation into ARM Application Run-Times
Antonio Joia Neto, Bilel Sefsaf, Norrathep Rattanavipanon +5
Modern mobile and edge platforms provide hardware-backed attestation of application and platform integrity at load-time. However, they offer little support once application executi…
Cage: Hardware-Accelerated Safe WebAssembly
Martin Fink, Dimitrios Stavrakakis, Dennis Sprokholt +3
WebAssembly (WASM) is an immensely versatile and increasingly popular compilation target. It executes applications written in several languages (e.g., C/C++) with near-native perfo…
Attestation with Constrained Relying Party
Mariam Moustafa, Arto Niemi, Philip Ginzboorg +1
Allowing a compromised device to receive privacy-sensitive sensor readings, or to operate a safety-critical actuator, carries significant risk. Usually, such risks are mitigated by…
Trusted Hart for Mobile RISC-V Security
Vladimir Ushakov, Sampo Sovio, Qingchao Qi +4
The majority of mobile devices today are based on Arm architecture that supports the hosting of trusted applications in Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). RISC-V is a relatively…
Color My World: Deterministic Tagging for Memory Safety
Hans Liljestrand, Carlos Chinea, Rémi Denis-Courmont +2
Hardware-assisted memory protection features are increasingly being deployed in COTS processors. ARMv8.5 Memory Tagging Extensions (MTE) is a recent example, which has been used to…
Camouflage: Hardware-assisted CFI for the ARM Linux kernel
Rémi Denis-Courmont, Hans Liljestrand, Carlos Chinea +1
Software control flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been applied to the Linux kernel for memory protection. Due to performance costs, deployed software CFI solutions are coarse gr…
Protecting the stack with PACed canaries
Hans Liljestrand, Zaheer Gauhar, Thomas Nyman +2
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcin…
PACStack: an Authenticated Call Stack
Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Lachlan J. Gunn +2
A popular run-time attack technique is to compromise the control-flow integrity of a program by modifying function return addresses on the stack. So far, shadow stacks have proven…
PAC it up: Towards Pointer Integrity using ARM Pointer Authentication
Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Kui Wang +3
Run-time attacks against programs written in memory-unsafe programming languages (e.g., C and C++) remain a prominent threat against computer systems. The prevalence of techniques…
CFI CaRE: Hardware-supported Call and Return Enforcement for Commercial Microcontrollers
Thomas Nyman, Jan-Erik Ekberg, Lucas Davi +1
With the increasing scale of deployment of Internet of Things (IoT), concerns about IoT security have become more urgent. In particular, memory corruption attacks play a predominan…
The Circle Game: Scalable Private Membership Test Using Trusted Hardware
Sandeep Tamrakar, Jian Liu, Andrew Paverd +3
Malware checking is changing from being a local service to a cloud-assisted one where users' devices query a cloud server, which hosts a dictionary of malware signatures, to check…
C-FLAT: Control-FLow ATtestation for Embedded Systems Software
Tigist Abera, N. Asokan, Lucas Davi +5
Remote attestation is a crucial security service particularly relevant to increasingly popular IoT (and other embedded) devices. It allows a trusted party (verifier) to learn the s…
Citizen Electronic Identities using TPM 2.0
Thomas Nyman, Jan-Erik Ekberg, N. Asokan
Electronic Identification (eID) is becoming commonplace in several European countries. eID is typically used to authenticate to government e-services, but is also used for other se…