5 papers
Camouflage: Hardware-assisted CFI for the ARM Linux kernel
Rémi Denis-Courmont, Hans Liljestrand, Carlos Chinea +1
Software control flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been applied to the Linux kernel for memory protection. Due to performance costs, deployed software CFI solutions are coarse gr…
Protecting the stack with PACed canaries
Hans Liljestrand, Zaheer Gauhar, Thomas Nyman +2
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcin…
PACStack: an Authenticated Call Stack
Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Lachlan J. Gunn +2
A popular run-time attack technique is to compromise the control-flow integrity of a program by modifying function return addresses on the stack. So far, shadow stacks have proven…
PAC it up: Towards Pointer Integrity using ARM Pointer Authentication
Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Kui Wang +3
Run-time attacks against programs written in memory-unsafe programming languages (e.g., C and C++) remain a prominent threat against computer systems. The prevalence of techniques…
CFI CaRE: Hardware-supported Call and Return Enforcement for Commercial Microcontrollers
Thomas Nyman, Jan-Erik Ekberg, Lucas Davi +1
With the increasing scale of deployment of Internet of Things (IoT), concerns about IoT security have become more urgent. In particular, memory corruption attacks play a predominan…