63 citations · 117 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
SERVAS! Secure Enclaves via RISC-V Authenticryption Shield
Stefan Steinegger, David Schrammel, Samuel Weiser +2
Isolation is a long-standing challenge of software security. Traditional privilege rings and virtual memory are more and more augmented with concepts such as capabilities, protecti…
Practical Enclave Malware with Intel SGX
Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss
Modern CPU architectures offer strong isolation guarantees towards user applications in the form of enclaves. For instance, Intel's threat model for SGX assumes fully trusted encla…
KeyDrown: Eliminating Keystroke Timing Side-Channel Attacks
Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss +4
Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke ti…
Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks
Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss +2
In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hyperviso…
SGXIO: Generic Trusted I/O Path for Intel SGX
Samuel Weiser, Mario Werner
Application security traditionally strongly relies upon security of the underlying operating system. However, operating systems often fall victim to software attacks, compromising…