activity
20142024
most citedDecentralized Convergence to Nash Equilibria in Constrained Deterministic Mean Field Control

146 citations · 380 across the 19 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing 2017Show all

6 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2017

A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis

Francesca Parise, Asuman Ozdaglar

We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underl…

cs.SI2017★ 66 cited

Centrality measures for graphons: Accounting for uncertainty in networks

Marco Avella-Medina, Francesca Parise, Michael T. Schaub +1

As relational datasets modeled as graphs keep increasing in size and their data-acquisition is permeated by uncertainty, graph-based analysis techniques can become computationally…

cs.GT2017

Sensitivity analysis for network aggregative games

Francesca Parise, Asuman Ozdaglar

We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium of constrained network aggregative games to changes in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the players. This…

eess.SY2017★ 4 cited

A distributed algorithm for average aggregative games with coupling constraints

Francesca Parise, Basilio Gentile, John Lygeros

We consider the framework of average aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. We focus on the ca…

eess.SY2017

Computing the projected reachable set of switched affine systems: an application to systems biology

Francesca Parise, Maria Elena Valcher, John Lygeros

A fundamental question in systems biology is what combinations of mean and variance of the species present in a stochastic biochemical reaction network are attainable by perturbing…

eess.SY2017★ 109 cited

Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints

Dario Paccagnan, Basilio Gentile, Francesca Parise +2

We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution,…