5 citations · 12 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers
Schelling Games with Continuous Types
Davide Bilò, Vittorio Bilò, Michelle Döring +3
In most major cities and urban areas, residents form homogeneous neighborhoods along ethnic or socioeconomic lines. This phenomenon is widely known as residential segregation and h…
Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Games
Tobias Friedrich, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor +1
Schelling games model the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation in metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point of view. In these games agents of different types each…
Tolerance is Necessary for Stability: Single-Peaked Swap Schelling Games
Davide Bilò, Vittorio Bilò, Pascal Lenzner +1
Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish age…
Towards Explainable Real Estate Valuation via Evolutionary Algorithms
Sebastian Angrick, Ben Bals, Niko Hastrich +6
Human lives are increasingly influenced by algorithms, which therefore need to meet higher standards not only in accuracy but also with respect to explainability. This is especiall…
Two-Stage Facility Location Games with Strategic Clients and Facilities
Simon Krogmann, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor +1
We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic…
The Flip Schelling Process on Random Geometric and Erdös-Rényi Graphs
Thomas Bläsius, Tobias Friedrich, Martin S. Krejca +1
Schelling's classical segregation model gives a coherent explanation for the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation. We consider an agent-based saturated open-city varia…
Fair Tree Connection Games with Topology-Dependent Edge Cost
Davide Bilò, Tobias Friedrich, Pascal Lenzner +2
How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect to a common target? We study this question with a simple tree formation game which is related to the well-known fair sin…
A Strategic Routing Framework and Algorithms for Computing Alternative Paths
Thomas Bläsius, Maximilian Böther, Philipp Fischbeck +9
Traditional navigation services find the fastest route for a single driver. Though always using the fastest route seems desirable for every individual, selfish behavior can have un…
Topological Influence and Locality in Swap Schelling Games
Davide Bilò, Vittorio Bilò, Pascal Lenzner +1
Residential segregation is a wide-spread phenomenon that can be observed in almost every major city. In these urban areas residents with different racial or socioeconomic backgroun…
Convergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling Segregation
Hagen Echzell, Tobias Friedrich, Pascal Lenzner +5
The phenomenon of residential segregation was captured by Schelling's famous segregation model where two types of agents are placed on a grid and an agent is content with her locat…
From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation
Matthias Feldotto, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor +1
Competing firms tend to select similar locations for their stores. This phenomenon, called the principle of minimum differentiation, was captured by Hotelling with a landmark model…
Schelling Segregation with Strategic Agents
Ankit Chauhan, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor
Schelling's segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can e…
Selfish Network Creation with Non-Uniform Edge Cost
Ankit Chauhan, Pascal Lenzner, Anna Melnichenko +1
Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic point of view. Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] many variants have been introduce…