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20122023
most citedOn the Constant Price of Anarchy Conjecture

7 citations · 9 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for

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cs.GT2023

Computing a Best Response against a Maximum Disruption Attack

Carme Àlvarez, Arnau Messegué

Inspired by scenarios where the strategic network design and defense or immunisation are of the central importance, Goyal et al. [3] defined a new Network Formation Game with Attac…

cs.GT2020

New Insights into the Structure of Equilibria for the Network Creation Game

Carme Àlvarez, Arnau Messegué

We study the sum classic network creation game introduced by Fabrikant et al. in which players conform a network buying links at individual price . When studying this model…

cs.GT2019

On the Price of Anarchy for High-Price Links

Carme Àlvarez, Arnau Messegué

We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classic model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker in 2003. This is…

cs.GT2018★ 7 cited

On the Constant Price of Anarchy Conjecture

C. Àlvarez, A. Messegué

We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classic model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a pre…

cs.GT2017

Network Creation Games: Structure vs Anarchy

Carme Àlvarez, Arnau Messegué

We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classical model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a p…

cs.GT2015

Stars and Celebrities: A Network Creation Game

Carme Àlvarez, Maria Blesa, Amalia Duch +2

Celebrity games, a new model of network creation games is introduced. The specific features of this model are that players have different celebrity weights and that a critical dist…

cs.GT2012★ 2 cited

Network Formation: Heterogeneous Traffic, Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics

Carme Àlvarez, Aleix Fernàndez

We study a network formation game where nodes wish to send traffic to other nodes. Nodes can contract bilaterally other nodes to form bidirectional links as well as nodes can break…