27 citations · 102 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
An Axiomatic Characterization of Split Cycle
Yifeng Ding, Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
A number of rules for resolving majority cycles in elections have been proposed in the literature. Recently, Holliday and Pacuit (Journal of Theoretical Politics 33 (2021) 475-524)…
Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
Wesley H. Holliday, Chase Norman, Eric Pacuit +1
A fundamental principle of individual rational choice is Sen's axiom, also known as expansion consistency, stating that any alternative chosen from each of two menus must be ch…
Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model
Wesley H. Holliday, Mikayla Kelley
There is an extensive literature in social choice theory studying the consequences of weakening the assumptions of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Much of this literature suggests t…
Stable Voting
Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candi…
Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections
Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by know…