activity
20132025
most citedRelaxing Exclusive Control in Boolean Games

7 citations · 15 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

10 papers

cs.GT2025

Formal Verification of Diffusion Auctions

Rustam Galimullin, Munyque Mittelmann, Laurent Perrussel

In diffusion auctions, sellers can leverage an underlying social network to broaden participation, thereby increasing their potential revenue. Specifically, sellers can incentivise…

cs.AI2023

Discounting in Strategy Logic

Munyque Mittelmann, Aniello Murano, Laurent Perrussel

Discounting is an important dimension in multi-agent systems as long as we want to reason about strategies and time. It is a key aspect in economics as it captures the intuition th…

cs.GT2022★ 2 cited

Reasoning about Human-Friendly Strategies in Repeated Keyword Auctions

Francesco Belardinelli, Wojtek Jamroga, Vadim Malvone +3

In online advertising, search engines sell ad placements for keywords continuously through auctions. This problem can be seen as an infinitely repeated game since the auction is ex…

cs.GT2021★ 4 cited

A General Framework for the Logical Representation of Combinatorial Exchange Protocols

Munyque Mittelmann, Sylvain Bouveret, Laurent Perrussel

The goal of this paper is to propose a framework for representing and reasoning about the rules governing a combinatorial exchange. Such a framework is at first interest as long as…

cs.LO2019

Game Description Logic with Integers: A GDL Numerical Extension

Munyque Mittelmann, Laurent Perrussel

Many problems can be viewed as games, where one or more agents try to ensure that certain objectives hold no matter the behavior from the environment and other agents. In recent ye…

cs.AI2019★ 2 cited

Refining HTN Methods via Task Insertion with Preferences

Zhanhao Xiao, Hai Wan, Hankui Hankz Zhuo +3

Hierarchical Task Network (HTN) planning is showing its power in real-world planning. Although domain experts have partial hierarchical domain knowledge, it is time-consuming to sp…

cs.AI2017★ 7 cited

Relaxing Exclusive Control in Boolean Games

Francesco Belardinelli, Umberto Grandi, Andreas Herzig +4

In the typical framework for boolean games (BG) each player can change the truth value of some propositional atoms, while attempting to make her goal true. In standard BG goals are…

cs.GT2016

Strategic disclosure of opinions on a social network

Umberto Grandi, Emiliano Lorini, Laurent Perrussel

We study the strategic aspects of social influence in a society of agents linked by a trust network, introducing a new class of games called games of influence. A game of influence…

cs.AI2015

Knowledge Sharing in Coalitions

Guifei Jiang, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel

The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability. We investigate this relation in the standard context…

cs.GT2013

Decomposing Truthful and Competitive Online Double Auctions

Dengji Zhao, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel

In this paper, we study online double auctions, where multiple sellers and multiple buyers arrive and depart dynamically to exchange one commodity. We show that there is no determi…