activity
20152026
most citedDoes telling white lies signal pro-social preferences?

43 citations · 53 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

9 papers

cs.GT2026

On the Convergence of Iterated Round Robin

Maxime Lucet, Henri Surugue, Nawal Benabbou +3

Round Robin (RR) is a simple and widely used picking sequence mechanism for allocating indivisible goods, known to guarantee envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) when preferences are…

cs.GT2026

Computational Social Choice: Research & Development

Dorothea Baumeister, Ratip Emin Berker, Niclas Boehmer +7

Computational social choice (COMSOC) studies principled ways to aggregate conflicting individual preferences into collective decisions. In this paper, we call for an increased effo…

cs.GT2024

Proportionality for Constrained Public Decisions

Julian Chingoma, Umberto Grandi, Arianna Novaro

We study situations where a group of voters need to take a collective decision over a number of public issues, with the goal of getting a result that reflects the voters' opinions…

cs.GT2023★ 3 cited

Repeated Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items

Ayumi Igarashi, Martin Lackner, Oliviero Nardi +1

The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incomp…

cs.AI2021

Collective discrete optimisation as judgment aggregation

Linus Boes, Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi +2

Many important collective decision-making problems can be seen as multi-agent versions of discrete optimisation problems. Participatory budgeting, for instance, is the collective v…

cs.AI2021

Unravelling multi-agent ranked delegations

Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi, Arianna Novaro

We introduce a voting model with multi-agent ranked delegations. This model generalises liquid democracy in two aspects: first, an agent's delegation can use the votes of multiple…

cs.AI2017★ 7 cited

Relaxing Exclusive Control in Boolean Games

Francesco Belardinelli, Umberto Grandi, Andreas Herzig +4

In the typical framework for boolean games (BG) each player can change the truth value of some propositional atoms, while attempting to make her goal true. In standard BG goals are…

cs.GT2016

Strategic disclosure of opinions on a social network

Umberto Grandi, Emiliano Lorini, Laurent Perrussel

We study the strategic aspects of social influence in a society of agents linked by a trust network, introducing a new class of games called games of influence. A game of influence…

physics.soc-ph2015★ 43 cited

Does telling white lies signal pro-social preferences?

Laura Biziou-van-Pol, Jana Haenen, Arianna Novaro +2

The opportunity to tell a white lie (i.e., a lie that benefits another person) generates a moral conflict between two opposite moral dictates, one pushing towards telling always th…