Improving the security of quantum direct communication with authentication

Abstract

Two protocols of quantum direct communication with authentication [Phys. Rev. A {\bf 73}, 042305 (2006)] are recently proposed by Lee, Lim and Yang. In this paper we will show that in the two protocols the authenticator Trent should be prevented from knowing the secret message of communication. The first protocol can be eavesdropped by Trent using the the intercept-measure-resend attack, while the second protocol can be eavesdropped by Trent using single-qubit measurement. To fix these leaks, I revise the original versions of the protocols by using the Pauli-Z operation ${\sigma }_z$ instead of the original bit-flip operation $X$. As a consequence, the protocol securities are improved.

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References in corpus (5)

• Secure Direct Communication with a Quantum One-Time-Pad
• Multiparty Quantum Secret Sharing
• Multiparty Quantum Secret Sharing Based on Entanglement Swapping
• Quantum Direct Communication with Authentication
• Improved Wójcik's Eavesdropping Attack on Ping-Pong Protocol Without Eavesdropping-Induced Channel Loss

Cited by in corpus (8)

• Revisiting the security of quantum dialogue and bidirectional quantum secure direct communication
• A generalized architecture of quantum secure direct communication for N disjointed users with authentication
• Efficient quantum direct communication with authentication
• Quantum Secure Direct Communication with Mutual Authentication using a Single Basis
• Quantum direct communication with mutual authentication
• Cryptanalysis of Quantum Secure Direct Communication Protocol with Mutual Authentication Based on Single Photons and Bell States
• Communication over Continuous Quantum Secure Dialogue using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen States
• Simple forms of SLOCC equivalent four-qubit \c{hi} state