Subjective and Objective Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics
arXiv:quant-ph/0501009 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.71.052107
Abstract
We discuss how the apparently objective probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics can be treated in the framework of Bayesian probability theory, in which all probabilities are subjective. Our results are in accord with earlier work by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack, but our approach and emphasis are different. We also discuss the problem of choosing a noninformative prior for a density matrix.
6 pages, RevTeX; references added in version 2
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- Hilbert-Schmidt Separability Probabilities and Noninformativity of Priors
- Quantum and Fisher Information from the Husimi and Related Distributions
- Decoherent Histories Quantum Mechanics Starting with Records of What Happens
- Relationalism vs. Bayesianism