Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals

Abstract

Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We investigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even better efficiency than in any correlated equilibrium with classical signals, and find the answer to be positive.

8 pages, LaTeX

References in corpus (1)

• Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems

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