Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals

Abstract

Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We investigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even better efficiency than in any correlated equilibrium with classical signals, and find the answer to be positive.

arXiv comment8 pages, LaTeX

References in corpus (3)

• Quantum Games and Quantum Strategies
• Quantum strategies
• Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems

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