Inductive Reasoning Games as Influenza Vaccination Models: Mean Field Analysis

Abstract

We define and analyze an inductive reasoning game of voluntary yearly vaccination in order to establish whether or not a population of individuals acting in their own self-interest would be able to prevent influenza epidemics. We find that epidemics are rarely prevented. We also find that severe epidemics may occur without the introduction of pandemic strains. We further address the situation where market incentives are introduced to help ameliorating epidemics. Surprisingly, we find that vaccinating families exacerbates epidemics. However, a public health program requesting prepayment of vaccinations may significantly ameliorate influenza epidemics.

20 pages, 7 figures

References in corpus (1)

• From Minority Games to real markets

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