On the value of optimal stopping games

Abstract

We show, under weaker assumptions than in the previous literature, that a perpetual optimal stopping game always has a value. We also show that there exists an optimal stopping time for the seller, but not necessarily for the buyer. Moreover, conditions are provided under which the existence of an optimal stopping time for the buyer is guaranteed. The results are illustrated explicitly in two examples.

Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/105051606000000204 in the Annals of Applied Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aap/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org)

Cited by in corpus (9)

• On the value of non-Markovian Dynkin games with partial and asymmetric information
• Dynkin Games and Israeli Options
• Optimal decision under ambiguity for diffusion processes
• Solving finite time horizon Dynkin games by optimal switching
• The Continuous Time Nonzero-sum Dynkin Game Problem and Application in Game Options
• Perpetual callable American volatility options in a mean-reverting volatility model
• On Dynkin games with incomplete information
• Nash equilibirum and the Legendre transform in optimal stopping games with one dimensional diffusions
• Perpetual Cancellable American Call Option