Do All Elliptic Curves of the Same Order Have the Same Difficulty of Discrete Log?

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to justify the common cryptographic practice of selecting elliptic curves using their order as the primary criterion. We can formalize this issue by asking whether the discrete log problem (DLOG) has the same difficulty for all curves over a given finite field with the same order. We prove that this is essentially true by showing polynomial time random reducibility of DLOG among such curves, assuming the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis (GRH). We do so by constructing certain expander graphs, similar to Ramanujan graphs, with elliptic curves as nodes and low degree isogenies as edges. The result is obtained from the rapid mixing of random walks on this graph. Our proof works only for curves with (nearly) the same endomorphism rings. Without this technical restriction such a DLOG equivalence might be false; however, in practice the restriction may be moot, because all known polynomial time techniques for constructing equal order curves produce only curves with nearly equal endomorphism rings.

26 pages, revised, to appear in Advances in Cryptology -- Asiacrypt 2005

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