The Theory of Everything vs the Theory of Anything
arXiv:gr-qc/9408023 · doi:10.1007/3-540-60024-8_126
Abstract
To what extent can our limited set of observations be used to pin down the specifics of a ``Theory of Everything''? In the limit where the links are arbitrarily tenuous, a ``Theory of Everything'' might become a ``Theory of Anything''. A clear understanding of what we can and can not expect to learn about the universe is particularly important in the field of particle cosmology. The aim of this article is to draw attention to some key issues which arise in this context, in the hopes of fostering further discussion. In particular, I explore the idea that a variety of different inflaton potentials may contribute to worlds ``like ours''. A careful examination of the conditional probability questions we can ask might give a physical measure of what is ``natural'' for an inflation potential which is quite different from those previously used.
13 pages plain LaTeX, no figures. To appear in the proceedings of ``The Birth of the Universe and Fundamental Forces'', Rome, May 1994, F. Occhionero Editor, Springer Verlag. Imperial/TP/93-94/56 REVISED 10/94: Minor improvements, more referneces, no major changes