NoSEBrEaK - Attacking Honeynets
arXiv:cs/0406052 · doi:10.1109/IAW.2004.1437807
Abstract
It is usually assumed that Honeynets are hard to detect and that attempts to detect or disable them can be unconditionally monitored. We scrutinize this assumption and demonstrate a method how a host in a honeynet can be completely controlled by an attacker without any substantial logging taking place.
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- Modelling the costs and benefits of Honeynets
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- Apate - A Linux Kernel Module for High Interaction Honeypots
- On Evaluating the Effectiveness of the HoneyBot: A Case Study