Generalized Qualitative Probability: Savage revisited
arXiv:cs/0202030
Abstract
Preferences among acts are analyzed in the style of L. Savage, but as partially ordered. The rationality postulates considered are weaker than Savage's on three counts. The Sure Thing Principle is derived in this setting. The postulates are shown to lead to a characterization of generalized qualitative probability that includes and blends both traditional qualitative probability and the ranked structures used in logical approaches.
Presented at UAI'96
Cited by in corpus (7)
- On the Qualitative Comparison of Decisions Having Positive and Negative Features
- Decision-making Under Ordinal Preferences and Comparative Uncertainty
- Qualitative Models for Decision Under Uncertainty without the Commensurability Assumption
- A Unified framework for order-of-magnitude confidence relations
- Nonstandard numbers for qualitative decision making
- Comparative Uncertainty, Belief Functions and Accepted Beliefs
- Truth and Knowledge