Entropy and typical properties of Nash equilibria in two-player games

Abstract

We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed bound, we calculate their number and analyse the properties of typical Nash equilibria, which are exponentially dominant in number. We find that a randomly chosen equilibrium realizes almost always equal payoffs to either player. This value and the fraction of strategies played at an equilibrium point are calculated as a function of the correlation between the two payoff matrices. The picture is complemented by the calculation of the properties of Nash equilibria in pure strategies.

6 pages, was "Self averaging of Nash equilibria in two player games", main section rewritten, some new results, for additional information see http://itp.nat.uni-magdeburg.de/~jberg/games.html

References in corpus (2)

• The Entropy of the K-Satisfiability Problem
• Matrix Games, Mixed Strategies, and Statistical Mechanics

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