Analysis of common attacks in LDPCC-based public-key cryptosystems

Abstract

We analyze the security and reliability of a recently proposed class of public-key cryptosystems against attacks by unauthorized parties who have acquired partial knowledge of one or more of the private key components and/or of the plaintext. Phase diagrams are presented, showing critical partial knowledge levels required for unauthorized decryption

14 pages, 6 figures

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Cited by in corpus (2)

• Cavity approach for real variables on diluted graphs and application to synchronization in small-world lattices
• Slowly evolving random graphs II: Adaptive geometry in finite-connectivity Hopfield models