Optimal strategies in collective Parrondo games
arXiv:cond-mat/0212358 · doi:10.1209/epl/i2003-00461-5
Abstract
We present a modification of the so-called Parrondo's paradox where one is allowed to choose in each turn the game that a large number of individuals play. It turns out that, by choosing the game which gives the highest average earnings at each step, one ends up with systematic loses, whereas a periodic or random sequence of choices yields a steadily increase of the capital. An explanation of this behavior is given by noting that the short-range maximization of the returns is "killing the goose that laid the golden eggs". A continuous model displaying similar features is analyzed using dynamic programming techniques from control theory.
4 pages, 6 figures, revised version in published form
Cited by in corpus (17)
- Feedback control in a collective flashing ratchet
- Brownian motion and gambling: from ratchets to paradoxical games
- Discrete--time ratchets, the Fokker--Planck equation and Parrondo's paradox
- Optimal sequence for Parrondo games
- Measuring the purity of a qubit state: entanglement estimation with fully separable measurements
- Purity estimation with separable measurements
- Inefficiency of voting in Parrondo games
- Extended Parrondo's Game and Brownian Ratchets: Strong and Weak Parrondo Effect
- Illusion of Control in a Brownian Game
- Optimal operation of feedback flashing ratchets
- Collective decision making and paradoxical games
- Selective altruism in collective games
- Predictive Maxwell's Demons
- A discrete dynamical system for the greedy strategy at collective Parrondo games
- Parrondo's Paradox: some new results and new ideas
- Parrondo games with two-dimensional spatial dependence
- Multi player Parrondo games with rigid coupling