A New Stochastic Strategy for the Minority Game

Abstract

We present a variant of the Minority Game in which players who where successful in the previous timestep stay with their decision, while the losers change their decision with a probability $p$. Analytical results for different regimes of $p$ and the number of players $N$ are given and connections to existing models are discussed. It is shown that for $p\propto 1/N$ the average loss ${\sigma }^2$ is of the order of 1 and does not increase with $N$ as for other known strategies.

4 pages, 3 figures

References in corpus (4)

• Exact solution of a modified El Farol's bar problem: Efficiency and the role of market impact
• Relevance of memory in Minority Games
• Theory of the evolutionary minority game
• Continuous time dynamics of the Thermal Minority Game

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