paper

When Better Artificial Intelligence Widens the Adoption Gap in Health Care

arXiv:2611.20561

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) can assist healthcare providers in clinical practice or replace services for which they are paid. We model how provider influence shapes two policy choices. The first is adoption, the share of cases in which coverage is switched to care using AI. The second is the review requirement, the number of paid reviews that must accompany AI when it is used in clinical care. Assistance can lower providers' costs and increase their profits while leaving paid reviews unaffected. However, increasingly capable AI may support autonomous use that can replace reviews and reduce providers' profits. Provider gains from adoption first rise and subsequently fall as AI capability improves. Hence, providers oppose sufficiently autonomous AI if their lost income from reviews exceeds savings from better assistance. Opposition to AI adoption arises earlier for AI that displaces more reviews. When providers can influence adoption but not the review requirement, their opposition causes under-adoption. The patient value forgone at the margin grows as AI improves. At interior policies, provider influence over both decisions widens adoption and raises review requirements above the patient optimum.