paper

TrustBound: Mechanized Completeness for Payment Epochs Initiated by AI Agents

arXiv:2611.19551

Abstract

Payment operations requested by an AI agent may remain executable, or their outcomes unresolved, after the agent has stopped. We study when a trusted payment service can account for every payment in an epoch and exclude further payments under earlier authority. We give a Lean model in which operations are recorded before they receive execution authority and both actions are serialized with an admission fence. We prove that fencing fixes a journal that covers every modeled effect and outstanding right; that discharging those rights prevents further effects; and that truthful outcomes for the recorded identities then give exact accounting. A provider-contract model, mapped to the admission model, makes created payment objects inert until registered. Premise-removal mutations confirm that each key premise is needed. We connect the models to an executable service: six service histories are checked against the model in Lean, and bounded schedules, scripted clients and concurrent workers exercise its reconciliation. The concurrent experiments uncovered a conflict caused by reordered provider reads, which serializing retrieval with journal updates removes in all tested cases. The result separates two obligations that are easily conflated in practice - preventing future payments and accounting for past ones - and states precisely which service guarantees establish each.

arXiv comment16 pages (LNCS), 2 figures, 8 tables. Code and Lean models: https://github.com/tokencraftdata/trustbound