paper

Covert System Identification Under Timing Constraints: A Static Linear Model and Its Detectability Implications

arXiv:2611.12579

Abstract

This paper studies covert system identification in cyber-physical systems, where an attacker infers plant dynamics while attempting to remain stealthy. We introduce a lightweight static linear model in which the time to execute a setpoint change is proportional to the commanded speed difference. On a Siemens PROFINET testbed this gain captures the drive's ramp response accurately but not its terminal overshoot. That omitted transient becomes the attacker's main exposure: on real traces, the residual left by the linear masking procedure is detected by two anomaly monitors, Process-Aware Stealthy-Attack Detection (PASAD) and the CUSUM change detector. Across the cascade identification and staircase attack strategies defined in the paper, the stealth boundary relates to the plant's own settling transients, a structural limit for this class of models under the adopted detector-calibration regime. Comparison against dynamic models obtained by N4SID, trained at multiple excitation amplitudes, shows that the evaluated N4SID models do not improve stealth over the structure-informed ramp model. Since per-cycle computation is negligible for both procedures, the binding trade-off is not inference cost but whether the attacker can acquire and refresh a model without injecting detectable perturbations.

arXiv commentPresented at the 27th International Symposium on Measurement and Control in Robotics (ISMCR 2026), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Proceedings forthcoming in Springer's Mechanisms and Machine Science series