The Ballot Event for Two-Player Coupon Collection: A Renewal--Catalan Asymptotic

Abstract

We study the two-player coupon-collector competition in which two independent collectors draw one coupon each per round from a set of $d$ equally likely coupon types. Myers and Wilf gave finite formulae for several two-player events and explicitly left open the ballot-type problem of finding the probability that the ultimate winner was never behind. We prove that this probability satisfies $$b_d\sim \frac{2}{d},d\to \infty .$$ The proof uses a renewal decomposition at the tie boundary. The first one-sided tie-break has an explicit entrance distribution; its level, scaled by $d^{1/2}$, converges to a Rayleigh law; and, after the break, the leader's survival probability is governed by a Catalan, or gambler's-ruin, harmonic. The main estimate shows that the accumulated defect of this comparison harmonic in the exact simultaneous-round chain is negligible.

21 pages, 1 table