When Safety Becomes a Vulnerability: Exploiting LLM Alignment Homogeneity for Transferable Blocking in RAG

Abstract

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to blocking attacks, in which poisoned documents cause large language models (LLMs) to refuse benign queries. Existing attacks rely on adversarial suffixes or explicit instructions, which are increasingly ineffective against modern LLMs, susceptible to prompt injection filtering, or require feedback from the target system. We observe overlapping risk categories and refusal criteria across safety-aligned LLMs, a phenomenon we term alignment homogeneity. This shared attack surface makes refusal-inducing context transferable across models. Accordingly, we propose TabooRAG, which optimizes one document per query for retrieval and refusal induction in a surrogate RAG environment, then transfers it to an unknown target system. Rather than injecting instructions, TabooRAG constructs query-relevant risk context to trigger alignment-driven refusal. To reduce optimization cost, it reuses validated strategies through a query-aware strategy library. Across nine LLMs and three datasets, TabooRAG achieves state-of-the-art ASR after filtering, with a 67.3% relative gain over the average per-setting best baseline. Further experiments show that TabooRAG remains effective with diverse surrogate models, against unseen target models, and under stronger RAG pipelines and existing defenses.

Expanded the scale of the experimental evaluation