paper

Discrepancy And Fair Division For Non-Additive Valuations

arXiv:2509.16802

Abstract

We extend the notion of combinatorial discrepancy to \emph{non-additive} functions. Our main result is an upper bound of on the non-additive -color discrepancy when is a prime power. We demonstrate two applications of this result to problems in fair division. First, we establish a bound for a consensus halving problem, where fairness is measured by the minimum number of items that must be transferred between the two parts to eliminate envy. Second, we improve the upper bound on the total subsidy required to achieve an envy-free allocation when the number of agents is a prime power, obtaining an bound. This constitutes the first known subquadratic guarantee in this setting.

Discrepancy And Fair Division For Non-Additive Valuations · wovepaper