paper

On likelihood of a Condorcet winner for uniformly random and independent voter preferences

arXiv:2506.20613

Abstract

We study a mathematical model of voting contest with voters and candidates, with each voter ranking the candidates in order of preference, without ties. A Condorcet winner is a candidate who gets more than votes in pairwise contest with every other candidate. An ``impartial culture'' setting is the case when each voter chooses his/her candidate preference list uniformly at random from all preferences, and does it independently of all other voters. For impartial culture case, Robert May and Lisa Sauermann showed that when is fixed ( and respectively), and grows indefinitely, the probability of a Condorcet winner is small, of order . We show if and , then for each fixed the probability of a Condercet winner is at most of order , thus converges to zero.

The main result is strengthened