Hydrodynamics of Cooperation and Self-Interest in a Two-Population Occupation Model

Abstract

We study the hydrodynamics of a system of agents who optimize either their individual utility (self-interest) or the collective welfare (cooperation). When agents act selfishly, their interactions are non-reciprocal, driving the system out of equilibrium; by contrast, purely altruistic dynamics restore reciprocity and yield an equilibrium-like description. We investigate how mixtures of these two behaviors shape the macroscopic properties of the liquid of agents. For highly rational agents, we find that introducing a small fraction of altruists can suppress the sub-optimal clustering induced by selfish dynamics. This phenomenon can be attributed to altruists localizing at interfaces and acting as effective surfactants, shedding a new light on earlier findings in fixed neighborhood-based models [Phys. Rev. Lett. \textbf{120}, 208301 (2018)]. When agents are boundedly rational, we introduce a well-mixed approximation that reduces the two-population model to a single effective scalar field theory. This allows us to leverage state-of-the-art tools from active matter to analytically characterize how altruism modifies surface tension and nucleation dynamics.

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