paper

Choice and independence of premise rules in intuitionistic set theory

arXiv:2411.19907

Abstract

Choice and independence of premise principles play an important role in characterizing Kreisel's modified realizability and Gödel's Dialectica interpretation. In this paper we show that a great many intuitionistic set theories are closed under the corresponding rules for finite types over . It is also shown that the existence property (or existential definability property) holds for statements of the form , where the variable ranges over objects of finite type . This applies in particular to (Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory) and (Intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory), two systems known not to have the general existence property. On the technical side, the paper uses a method that amalgamates generic realizability for set theory with truth, whereby the underlying partial combinatory algebra is required to contain all objects of finite type.