Maximizing Nash Social Welfare in 2-Value Instances: A Simpler Proof for the Half-Integer Case

Abstract

A set of $m$ indivisible goods is to be allocated to a set of $n$ agents. Each agent $i$ has an additive valuation function $v_i$ over goods. The value of a good $g$ for agent $i$ is either $1$ or $s$, where $s$ is a fixed rational number greater than one, and the value of a bundle of goods is the sum of the values of the goods in the bundle. An \emph{allocation} $X$ is a partition of the goods into bundles $X_1$, \ldots, $X_n$, one for each agent. The \emph{Nash Social Welfare} ($\NSW$) of an allocation $X$ is defined as \[ \NSW(X) = \left( \prod_i v_i(X_i) \right)^{\sfrac{1}{n}}.\] The \emph{$\NSW$-allocation} maximizes the Nash Social Welfare. In~\cite{NSW-twovalues-halfinteger} it was shown that the $\NSW$-allocation can be computed in polynomial time, if $s$ is an integer or a half-integer, and that the problem is NP-complete otherwise. The proof for the half-integer case is quite involved. In this note we give a simpler and shorter proof

arXiv commentarXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2207.10949