Defending the Quantum Reconstruction Program

Abstract

The program of reconstructing quantum theory based on information-theoretic principles enjoys much popularity in the foundations of physics. Surprisingly, this endeavor has only received very little attention in philosophy. Here I argue that this should change. This is because, on the one hand, reconstructions can help us to better understand quantum mechanics, and, on the other hand, reconstructions are themselves in need of interpretation. My overall objective, thus, is to motivate the reconstruction program and to show why philosophers should care. My specific aims are threefold. (i) Clarify the relationship between reconstructing and interpreting quantum mechanics, (ii) show how the informational reconstruction of quantum theory puts pressure on standard realist interpretations, (iii) defend the quantum reconstruction program against possible objections.

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