Evolution of cooperation with Q-learning: the impact of information perception

Abstract

The inherent complexity of human beings manifests in a remarkable diversity of responses to intricate environments, enabling us to approach problems from varied perspectives. However, in the study of cooperation, existing research within the reinforcement learning framework often assumes that individuals have access to identical information when making decisions, which contrasts with the reality that individuals frequently perceive information differently. In this study, we employ the Q-learning algorithm to explore the impact of information perception on the evolution of cooperation in a two-person Prisoner's Dilemma game. We demonstrate that the evolutionary processes differ significantly across three distinct information perception scenarios, highlighting the critical role of information structure in the emergence of cooperation. Notably, the asymmetric information scenario reveals a complex dynamical process, including the emergence, breakdown, and reconstruction of cooperation, mirroring psychological shifts observed in human behavior. Our findings underscore the importance of information structure in fostering cooperation, offering new insights into the establishment of stable cooperative relationships among humans.

13pages, 13figures, comments are appreciated

References in corpus (15)

• Evolutionary games on graphs
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Social physics
• Mathematical foundations of moral preferences
• Evolutionary dynamics of any multiplayer game on regular graphs
• Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare
• Evolution of cooperation in the public goods game with Q-learning
• Emergence of Cooperation in Two-agent Repeated Games with Reinforcement Learning
• Development of swarm behavior in artificial learning agents that adapt to different foraging environments
• Decoding trust: A reinforcement learning perspective
• Dynamical reciprocity in interacting games: numerical results and mechanism analysis
• Emergence of cooperation in a population with bimodal response behaviors
• Catalytic evolution of cooperation in a population with behavioural bimodality
• Social hierarchy promotes the cooperation prevalence