Almost Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods: A Tale of Two Valuations
arXiv:2407.05139
Abstract
The existence of allocations stands as one of the main challenges in discrete fair division.In this paper, we present symmetrical results on the existence of and its approximate variations for two distinct valuations: restricted additive valuations and -bounded valuations introduced by Christodoulou \etal \cite{christodoulou2023fair}. In a -bounded instance, each good has relevance for at most agents, and any pair of agents shares at most common relevant goods. We show that instances with -bounded valuations admit allocations and allocations with at most discarded goods, mirroring results for the restricted additive setting \cite{akrami2022ef2x}. We also present algorithms for both restricted additive and -bounded subadditive settings. The symmetry of these results suggests these valuations share symmetric structures. Building on this, we propose an allocation for restricted additive valuations when and . To achieve these results, we further develop the rank concept introduced by Farhadi \etal \cite{farhadi2021almost} and introduce several new concepts such as virtual value, rankpath, and root, which advance the overall understanding of allocations. In addition, we suggest an updating rule based on the virtual values which we believe will lead to broader and more generalized results on .