paper

Asymptotic Value in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Vanishing Stage Duration and Public Signals

arXiv:2403.07467

Abstract

We study -discounted zero-sum games as the discount factor approaches (that is, the players are more and more patient), in the context of games with stage duration. In stochastic games with stage duration , players act at times , and so on. The payoff and leaving probabilities are proportional to . When tends to , such discrete-time games approximate games played in continuous time. The asymptotic behavior of the values (when both and tend to ) has already been studied for stochastic games with full state observation and for state-blind games. We consider the same question for the case of stochastic games with deterministic public signals on the state. We construct a stochastic game with public signals, with no asymptotic value (as the discount factor goes to ) if the stage duration is , but with an asymptotic value when the stage duration and the discount factor both tend to . Informally, this means that the asymptotic value in discrete time does not exist, whereas it does exist in continuous time. This situation cannot occur in stochastic games with full state observation.