Making Existing Quantum Position Verification Protocols Secure Against Arbitrary Transmission Loss

Abstract

Signal loss poses a significant threat to the security of quantum cryptography when the chosen protocol lacks loss-tolerance. In quantum position verification (QPV) protocols, even relatively small loss rates can compromise security. The goal is thus to find protocols that remain secure under practically achievable loss rates. In this work, we modify the usual structure of QPV protocols and prove that this modification makes the potentially high transmission loss between the verifiers and the prover security-irrelevant for a class of protocols that includes a practically-interesting candidate protocol inspired by the BB84 protocol (${\mathrm{QPV}}_{BB84}^f$). This modification, which involves photon presence detection, a small time delay at the prover, and a commitment to play before proceeding, reduces the overall loss rate to just the prover's laboratory. The adapted protocol c-${\mathrm{QPV}}_{BB84}^f$ then becomes a practically feasible QPV protocol with strong security guarantees, even against attackers using adaptive strategies. As the loss rate between the verifiers and prover is mainly dictated by the distance between them, secure QPV over longer distances becomes possible. We also show possible implementations of the required photon presence detection, making c-${\mathrm{QPV}}_{BB84}^f$ a protocol that solves all major practical issues in QPV. Finally, we discuss experimental aspects and give parameter estimations.

38 pages, 6 figures, updated proof of main theorem

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• Impossibility of perfect cheating for single-qubit position verification