SoK: A Data-driven View on Methods to Detect Reflective Amplification DDoS Attacks Using Honeypots
arXiv:2302.04614 · doi:10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00041
Abstract
In this paper, we revisit the use of honeypots for detecting reflective amplification attacks. These measurement tools require careful design of both data collection and data analysis including cautious threshold inference. We survey common amplification honeypot platforms as well as the underlying methods to infer attack detection thresholds and to extract knowledge from the data. By systematically exploring the threshold space, we find most honeypot platforms produce comparable results despite their different configurations. Moreover, by applying data from a large-scale honeypot deployment, network telescopes, and a real-world baseline obtained from a leading DDoS mitigation provider, we question the fundamental assumption of honeypot research that convergence of observations can imply their completeness. Conclusively we derive guidance on precise, reproducible honeypot research, and present open challenges.
arXiv commentcamera-ready
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