Exit options sustain altruistic punishment and decrease the second-order free-riders, but it is not a panacea

Abstract

Altruistic punishment, where individuals incur personal costs to punish others who have harmed third parties, presents an evolutionary conundrum as it undermines individual fitness. Resolving this puzzle is crucial for understanding the emergence and maintenance of human cooperation. This study investigates the role of an alternative strategy, the exit option, in explaining altruistic punishment. We analyze a two-stage prisoner's dilemma game in well-mixed and networked populations, considering both finite and infinite scenarios. Our findings reveal that the exit option does not significantly enhance altruistic punishment in well-mixed populations. However, in networked populations, the exit option enables the existence of altruistic punishment and gives rise to complex dynamics, including cyclic dominance and bi-stable states. This research contributes to our understanding of costly punishment and sheds light on the effectiveness of different voluntary participation strategies in addressing the conundrum of punishment.

15 pages, 8 figures

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