From Outcome-Based to Language-Based Preferences

Abstract

We review the literature on models that try to explain human behavior in social interactions described by normal-form games with monetary payoffs. We start by covering social and moral preferences. We then focus on the growing body of research showing that people react to the language in which actions are described, especially when it activates moral concerns. We conclude by arguing that behavioral economics is in the midst of a paradigm shift towards language-based preferences, which will require an exploration of new models and experimental setups.

Forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Literature

References in corpus (1)

• Mathematical foundations of moral preferences

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